Mr President, now you understand India
Last week, President Donald Trump made a bold pivot that reshaped the global energy debate. Faced with high diesel prices at home, weeks before the US mid-term elections, he turned to President Vladimir Putin. Russia agreed to supply more than 300,000 tonnes of diesel immediately to the American and global markets, with supplies rising to one million tonnes by December.
President Trump explained his objective with characteristic clarity: bring down prices for American farmers, ranchers, truckers, and consumers. That decision reflects the same practical logic India has consistently followed in securing affordable energy.
Mr President, I hope now you understand India’s compulsion. The Lindsey O. Graham Act of 2026 empowers the US President to impose tariffs of up to 100% on major purchasers of Russian energy. But what matters is how fairly he exercises his discretion. India’s case has always been straightforward. We are one of the world’s largest importers of crude oil. Energy is not a discretionary purchase for us. Its price flows through almost everything an Indian household consumes.
India bought Russian crude for its competitive price. Much has changed since then. And those changes have strengthened India’s argument.
Saudi Arabia has sharply reduced crude prices for Asian buyers. Venezuelan crude has become increasingly attractive to Indian refiners because of deep discounts, while Russian crude has become relatively more expensive. India swiftly diversified its crude sources.
That matters because it establishes something often lost in the geopolitical debate. India’s policy was never: we must buy Russian oil. It was: we must buy affordable energy. If you want India to buy less Russian oil, make alternative oil competitive.
Markets can often accomplish what sanctions and threats cannot. Then came the US’s own encounter with the same reality. President Trump turned to Russian diesel because American consumers were hurting. There’s nothing inherently wrong with that. An elected government is expected to protect the economic interests of its people.
But that principle cannot stop at US borders. In 2025, India’s GDP per capita stood at about $2,700, a fraction of America’s approximately $90,000. Yet when high diesel prices threaten American farmers and households, Washington considers it legitimate to relax restrictions and bring Russian diesel into the American and global markets. When India buys discounted Russian crude for 1.4 billion people, it is asked to absorb the higher cost of alternative energy—or risk economic consequences. Why is affordability a valid national interest in Washington, but a questionable foreign-policy goal for New Delhi?
For millions of Indians, affordable energy isn’t just economics; it affects everyday life. A small rise in diesel prices ripples far beyond the fuel pump and eventually reaches almost every household. If fuel inflation is politically painful in one of the world’s richest countries, imagine its consequences in a country with barely 3% of America’s GDP per capita.
What Washington once questioned as India’s justification has now, in substance, become Washington’s own policy. Even in 2025, Russia remained the European Union’s second-largest supplier of LNG. European governments have industries to protect, households to heat, and economies to run. Precisely the same understanding must extend to India. There is a larger lesson here.
Countries may speak the language of principles, but governments have a fundamental responsibility to their own citizens. When energy security, economic stability, or national security is threatened, even the world’s most powerful nations preserve room for manoeuvre. India must preserve the same room for itself.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government deserves credit for resisting considerable international pressure when India’s energy security required it, without turning that resistance into an ideological alignment with Moscow. India has not picked Russia over America—or Ukraine. It has chosen India.
If Saudi crude is cheaper and commercially appropriate, we should buy Saudi crude. If Venezuelan oil offers better economics and can lawfully be purchased, refiners should buy Venezuelan oil. And where Russian crude remains commercially compelling and lawful, the Indian government cannot reasonably be expected to make its citizens pay substantially more merely to satisfy another country’s geopolitical preference.
That is not alignment. It is strategic autonomy. And strategic autonomy matters increasingly in a world where economic and geopolitical power are again inseparable. India’s ability to maintain that autonomy also tells us something about national strength. A country needs sufficient economic weight, diplomatic credibility, and political leadership to secure a seat at the table. Without them, sooner or later, others begin making its choices for it.
Ironically, we have arrived at a clearer understanding. America wanted India to understand why Russian energy presented a geopolitical problem. India wanted America to understand why affordable energy was an economic necessity. Perhaps today both understand each other a little better.
President Trump’s decision to secure Russian diesel should not be condemned. It should be understood for what it is: a government acting to protect its people from higher energy costs. India seeks no special treatment—just the same understanding America gives itself.
Mr President, if Russian diesel can help protect an American farmer or trucker from unaffordable fuel prices, surely you can understand why the world’s largest democracy cannot casually pass higher energy costs on to 1.4 billion Indians.
Your citizens matter. So do ours.